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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Priority setting in Health is a complex task that needs to be based on explicit criteria. While 
economic evaluations fulfil these requirements, there still remain further shortcomings in the 
current theory and practice of economic evaluation. One of them, which has attracted the interest 
of health economists and other professionals, refers to the equity dimension of health. A large 
amount of the literature reviewed in this paper addresses methodological solutions for addressing 
distributional concerns in economic evaluations. Yet, even though most authors agree with the general 
aim of reducing health inequalities, practical implementation issues that should inform policy are far 
from clear. This paper will review methods and tools for priority-setting, taking both equity and 
efficiency into consideration. This will be followed by recommendations on further research. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the early nineties, health economists were already advocating for a greater consideration of both 
equity and efficiency criteria in health resource allocation, proposing guidelines for examining a 
formula for resource allocation that would address this equity-efficiency trade-off (Sheldon & Carr-
Hill, 1991:18). Wagstaff (1991:21) was writing: "As the volume of research on quality-adjusted life 
years (QALYs) has increased, concern has begun to be expressed about the equity aspects of 
resource allocation decisions based on the results of this research". 
Focusing particularly on developing countries, Gwatkin remarked in 2001 that the work to date 
has produced significant increases in knowledge about the magnitude and nature of health 
inequalities, but had not yet reached the heart of the matter: "the identification of measures that can 
effectively deal with inequalities that have been uncovered" (p. 722). This paper will consider 
methodological solutions for addressing distributional concerns in economic evaluations, along with 
practical implementation issues that should inform policy when trying to reduce health inequalities. 
The role of both researchers and policy-makers is of paramount importance in economic 
evaluation and priority setting. They can adopt either the classical welfare economic or the extra-welfarist 
economic approach as a normative basis. Extra-welfarism is the approach used in this paper when 
considering the role of the government in resource allocation and shaping health policies. Before 
going deeper into these concerns, we shall consider the difference between these two concepts: 
• Welfarism argues that the government should base its redistribution policies on information 
about the utility functions of individuals and mainly addresses issues of market failures 
(asymmetry of demand, externalities, public good aspects, etc.). Consequently, well-being is 
identified with utility, and does not consider those aspects of life that do not have a reflection 
in utility (happiness, concern over elderly people, guarantee of civil rights, etc). 
• Extra-welfarism predicts a broader role for the government in funding and providing health 
care. For the extra-welfarists, the leading priority-setting criterion is to maximize health. This 
implies that health care resources should be directed towards the programs and individuals 
for which health gains are highest (Hauck, Smith & Goddard, 2003:6). The important role of 
the state in funding and providing health care derives from the fact that positive right goods, 
such as health care, education, food, "are essential to each individual in that they allow them 
to express their fundamental capabilities, i.e. to make choices that allow them to fully express 
themselves in society. According to extra-welfarism, the government should guarantee the 
provision of health care to its citizens as a recognition of their positive freedom rights, not 
only as a consequence of problems of market failures in health care systems". (Jones, 
2002:74-5). Still, extra-welfarists have been criticized for focusing solely on health 
maximization and thus efficiency considerations. However, most extra-welfarists agree that 
priority setting should also incorporate equity objectives (Hauck, Smith & Goddard, 2003:6). 
Priority setting in Health needs to be based on explicit criteria.  In chapter 2, we will see that 
economic evaluations fulfil these requirements but that there are still some shortcomings in the 
current theory and practice of economic evaluation; one of these refers to the equity dimension of 
health. All seem to agree with the general aim of reducing health inequalities. However, practical 
notions of equity that should inform policy are far from clear. Chapter 3 will try to clarify this 
concept of equity and issues related to practical implementation. Chapter 4 will review the state of 
research in the field of equity-efficiency trade-off and present methods and tools taking both equity 
and efficiency into consideration in the priority-setting process. Finally, chapter 5 will give some 
recommendations for further research on the subject. 
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2. ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS 
In the broad health context, the usual clinical evaluation has been seeking to answer the question: 
"Does this intervention do more good than harm?" In economic evaluations, we go one step 
forward and ask ourselves: "In addition to the effectiveness of this intervention, were health care 
resources used in an efficient way?" 
The concept of efficiency may be interpreted in different ways. The literature often uses the 
concept of efficiency referred to as Pareto-optimality. This concept of efficiency was elaborated 
over a century ago by the economist Vilfredo Pareto, nowadays still frequently used, who argued 
that : "an economically efficient (optimal) outcome in society is one under which it is impossible to 
improve the lot of any person without hurting someone else". In our health economics context, 
"lot" has to be considered as "the level of welfare" and welfare as "a measure of an individual's or a 
society's level of well-being".1 Well-being in turn can be interpreted as utility or as health. As we will 
take an extra-welfarist approach seen in the introduction, health will be our outcome measure.  
Efficiency and thus economic analysis are important because resources – such as people, time, 
equipment, knowledge, etc – are scarce. Consequently, choices must be made through organized 
consideration of the factors involved. Drummond et al. (1997:7-8) list three main reasons for using 
economic evaluations when making choices to commit resources to one use instead of another: 
1. Without systematic analysis, it is difficult to identify clearly the relevant alternatives. The new proposal must 
be compared to the existing activities and programmes competing. 
2. The viewpoint assumed in an analysis is important. Viewpoints may be the patient, the Ministry of 
Health budget, the community or society, etc. 
3. Without some attempt at measurement, the uncertainty surrounding orders of magnitude can be critical. The 
concept of opportunity cost is important in this context, as "the real cost of any programme is 
not the number of dollars appearing on the programme budget, but rather the health outcomes 
achievable in some other programme which have been forgone by committing the resources in 
question to the first programme". 
Economic analysis deals with inputs and outputs of activities, sometimes called costs and 
consequences (or also benefits, outcomes). It can for example analyse whether the additional benefits of a 
new intervention are greater that the additional costs over the existing one or compared to doing 
nothing. Johannesson (1996:221-236) stresses the importance of economic evaluations of health 
care programmes as an aid to decisions and policy making in different contexts: the development of 
treatment guidelines, decisions within health care organizations, introduction of new medical 
technologies, reimbursement decisions, and pricing decisions.  Two of these contexts will be of 
main importance to us in this paper; decisions within health care organizations and reimbursement 
decisions, as they introduce the question of equity of access or delivery.  
This chapter introduces the four different types of economic evaluations: cost-minimization, 
cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit and cost-utility. The latter will be emphasized, as it will play an 
important role in chapter 4. We will then go through some methodological and practical issues. 
Finally, we will consider some shortcomings regarding the equity dimension. 
 
                                                          
1   The definitions are from Folland, Goodman & Stano (2001), pp. 420, 615 and 617. 
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2.1 DIFFERENT TYPES 
All forms of economic evaluations employ – or are supposed to employ – the same costing 
methods, of which we will see briefly some aspects in the of the next section "methodological 
issues". However, they differ in the way that the outcomes of health interventions are measured. We 
will see here four different forms of economic evaluations, but will give a special emphasis on one 
of them – the cost-utility analysis, as QALYs will be of major importance in our subject. 
 
2.1.1 Cost-minimization analysis 
Cost-minimization analysis (CMA) is a special form of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) and also 
the simplest form of economic evaluation. Only costs are compared across alternative, as the 
outcomes are similar for the interventions being compared. For example, two different programmes 
involving minor surgery would be compared, and both would have the same outcome, i.e. the 
number of operations completed successfully. However, they would differ in the procedures and 
thus imply different costs. In fact, as Drummond et al. (1997:12) underline it, "few studies are 
designed, from the outset, to be cost-minimization analysis. Either they are designed as cost-
effectiveness analysis and end up being simplified because the consequences turn out to be 
equivalent, or they are designed as cost analysis in the knowledge that previous clinical research has 
demonstrated equivalence in consequences." In CMA and in CEA, the measures of effectiveness 
can be, for example, years of life gained, mmHg blood pressure reduction, etc. 
 
2.1.2 Cost-effectiveness analysis 
In CEA, both cost and consequences of the different alternatives are examined. One single 
outcome, such as cases found or life-years gained, is chosen and outcomes are compared with costs. 
The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER, also sometimes referred as C/E ratio) is calculated 
as such: 
ICER = 
CA – CB 
                   EA – EB 
where CA and CB are the costs of the interventions A and B, while EA and EB are the effects (or 
measures of effectiveness) of interventions A and B. The intervention B can be the option of doing 
nothing, or minimum care, usual care, or the highest valued alternative intervention. Interventions 
that have a relative low ICER would have a high chance of being chosen over the alternative 
intervention. However, "which value is low enough for the intervention to be chosen is a subjective 
decision, depending ultimately on the value society places on a unit of health effect". (Hauck, Smith 
& Goddard, 2003:9) 
 
2.1.3 Cost-benefit analysis 
In cost-benefit analysis (CBA), the consequences of health care programmes are valued in money 
terms. The advantage of this method is a direct answer to the question of whether the benefits of 
the treatment justify the costs. In addition, CBA can account for other potentially important non-
health outcomes of an intervention, such as an increase in productivity gains, or a decrease in 
 8 
criminality through a certain mental health intervention (James et al. 2004:7) .The main difficulty in 
this form of economic evaluation is to value health outcomes in money terms. Different methods 
have been used in the past and nowadays, the dominant approach in studies is by assessing 
individuals' willingness-to-pay (WTP) for improved health. 
 
2.1.4 Cost-utility analysis 
The literature often does not differentiate CEA and cost-utility analysis (CUA), and refers to both 
as CEA. The only difference between both is that CUA is using a generic (or summary) measure of 
health status, such as the very well known quality-adjusted life-year (QALY)2. Other generic 
measures of health status have been proposed, such as disability-adjusted life-year (DALY), healthy-
year equivalents (HYE), saved-young-life equivalents (SAVE). This paper will focus on the most 
well known and widely used generic measure, QALY. This measure is especially used in the 
literature on the equity-efficiency trade-off debates. Some other measures, such as years of healthy 
life (YHL), health-adjusted person years (HAPY) and health-adjusted life expectancy (HALE) are 
just aliases.  
In CUA, the incremental cost (usually in dollars) of a programme is compared to the incremental 
health improvement (in QALY gained) attributable to the programme. The results are thus usually 
expressed as cost per QALY gained. In order to calculate the QALYs gained, health states first have 
to be valued on an interval going from 1, perfect health, to 0, death. Note that health states can also 
have a negative value, which is the case when the health state is considered worse than death. In 
addition to the length of life, CUA thus include the quality of life component, which is of paramount 
importance when measuring health outcomes. 
 
2.1.4.1 Valuating health states 
For our concern, understanding the valuation of health states will be of crucial importance. There 
are different methods to obtain values for health states3. Among these methods, there are 
techniques to measure directly the preferences of individuals, such as the standard gamble, the 
visual analogue scale or the time trade-off. We will see the standard gamble in more details. There 
are also pre-scored "multi-attribute health status classification systems", such as quality of well-
being (QWB), health utilities index (HUI), or EuroQol (EQ-5D). The latter will be described.  
The standard gamble can be used for both chronic and temporary health states. We will see 
the chronic case. As summarized in figure 2.1, the standard gamble consists in asking individuals to 
make a choice between the certainty of remaining in a given chronic state i and an alternative which 
would be a treatment with two possible outcomes: perfect health and death. The probability p of the 
perfect health outcome is then varied until the respondent is indifferent between two alternatives: 
the gamble and the certainty. At the point of indifference, the required preference value for state i is 
simply p.  
                                                          
2   The terminology "cost-utility analysis" can be in a way misleading as QALY is a measure of people's health 
and generally not a measure of the utility they derive from it, such as in the welfarist sense. This terminology 
is used because QALYs are derived using utility theory in an experimental setting (Wagstaff, 1991:22-3). As 
per Drummond et al (1997:183), a QALY is in general not a utility, but could turn out to be one only under 
quite restrictive assumptions. 
3   A problem with the fact that different methods are used is that different values for the effects of programs 
will be generated. As Hauck, Smith & Goddard (2003:9) point out, "This has the potential to reduce greatly 
the comparability of studies, which in turn reduces the value of using relative CE ratios to make priority-
setting decisions".  
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Figure 2.1: Standard gamble for a chronic health state preferred to death 
Source: Drummond MF & Sheldon T, 2002:93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EuroQol (EQ-5D) is a system with five attributes: mobility, self-care, usual activity, 
pain/discomfort, anxiety/depression. For each attribute, you have to choose between three levels: 
whether you have "no problem", "some problems", or "major problems". Two separate health 
states are also listed; "unconscious" and "dead". So there are a total of 245 health states in all.  
In order to calculate the QALYs of the health state somebody is experiencing, relevant 
coefficients from a scoring function have to be subtracted from 1. For example, the state 11223, 
which is full mobility, full self-care, some problems in usual activity, some pain/discomfort and 
major anxiety/depression is 0.255. State 23322 has a value of 0.079, close to death, and 33332 a 
value of -0.429, which is below death.  Note that the preferences for the scoring function were 
measured with the time trade-off technique (TTO) on a random sample of about 3000 adults 
among the United Kingdom population (Drummond et al., 1997:162-4). 
 
2.1.4.2 Calculating QALY gained 
In order to obtain the total QALY score of an individual without programme and with programme, 
one must multiply (or "weight") each remaining period of time of this individual's life by the 
expected quality of life in the period in question. In figure 2.2 below, the area representing the 
QALYs gained with the treatment programme can be compared with the QALYs experienced 
without programme. The cost-utility ratio indicates the additional costs required to generate a year 
of perfect health (one QALY). 
 
Figure 2.2: Quality-adjusted life-years gained from an intervention 
      Source: Drummond MF & Sheldon T, 2002:89 
 
 
We can see from this figure 
that QALY is a measure that 
captures changes in both the 
quality of life (morbidity in 
area A) and length of life 
(mortality in area B). 
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2.2 METHODOLOGICAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES 
It has been found that decision-makers do not widely use the results of economic evaluation 
research. Many reasons are discussed in the literature, both methodological and practical. 
Recommendations generally tend to the same conclusions: efforts should be made to make 
economic evaluations as simple and transparent as possible (Hauck, Smith & Goddard, 2003: 22). 
We will briefly discuss here some key issues faced by researchers and policy-makers. 
 
2.2.1 Who decides on quality weights 
Much debate surrounds who should be involved in placing values on health states. The dominant 
stand point seems to judge the general public's preferences as the most valid, yet there are debates 
about rather considering other preferences, such as that of patients, experts or policymakers. In 
addition to those, the view of health care professionals is important as it is often the one judged to 
represent the patient's best interest. 
Having patients valuing health state would – at least to some extend – overcome a major 
problem reported in the literature, which is that we fail to recognize adaptation processes. For 
example, a health state 23322 would most probably not have been valued 0.079, i.e. close to death, 
by a patient in that state. Dolan (2005:13) explains it very well: "The public only focus on the 
transitional losses and the fear associated with their change of health and ignore the adaptation, 
whilst patients focus only on the adaptation and ignore the transitional losses."4 He proposes a 
valuation technique called Day Reconstruction Method (DRM) which may help overcoming this 
problem 
Another concern is whether values assigned to health states should be ex ante or ex post, i.e. 
before or after health care programmes. Nord (1999:80-82) argues that QALYs are supposed to aid 
ex ante judgments of interventions, but are most helpful if they are based on data from real 
experiences with illness, and thus measured ex post. This is however often not clear in the QALY 
literature and in economic evaluations.  
 
2.2.2 Target populations 
The target population can have an important impact on the cost-effectiveness of an intervention. 
This is why C/E analysis should be undertaken in subgroups within a target population. This could 
for example bring to light the difference of C/E ratio between a programme for urban children in 
comparison with rural children, or young versus elderly women. 
 
2.2.3 Perspective of the analysis 
Economic evaluations can be carried out from different perspectives, which will greatly affect the 
                                                          
4   Dolan (2005:11-15) reports that when people are asked to imagine for example paraplegia, they are 
thinking about it as being 24/7, all day everyday. In health economic valuation studies, the attention is drawn 
to transitional loss, not thinking that in such a physical state you may still enjoy your social life, get the same 
fun from watching television. This is why valuations from the general public are generally lower that 
valuations from patients.  
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cost-effectiveness or cost-utility ratio of a programme. The societal perspective is the broadest and 
incorporates all costs (health care, social services, education, patients and family) and all health 
effects, regardless of who incurs or obtains them. Indeed, economic evaluations could optimally 
include consideration of the quality of life of carers and other family members. Other perspectives 
are: governmental, health care institution, patient and family, third-party payer. Hauck, Smith & 
Goddard (2003:13) state that economic evaluations tend to be the most useful in the priority-setting 
process when using the societal perspective. 
Wailoo et al. (2005:537) are arguing in their editorials that the United Kingdom's National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) issues clinical guidelines with too little cost-effectiveness 
evidence and too little social viewpoint. They advise NICE to describe clearly the individual 
viewpoints of patients and society in its clinical guidelines. 
 
2.2.4 Generalizability 
Health care decision makers have limited resources to conduct primary research and may wish to 
transfer results from other economic evaluations to their own setting. Unfortunately, researchers 
often encounter a lack of transferability of study results. This is due to many studies not clearly 
reporting the methods used to calculate the costs and/or not providing all the necessary data inputs, 
rendering the recalculation of the results impossible (Mumford et al. 1998:33). Walker and Fox-
Rushby (2000) even demonstrated through a critical review of published economic evaluations of 
communicable disease interventions in developing countries that the usefulness of this literature for 
international comparisons has to be questioned, due to many methodological inconsistencies. 
Different attempts have been made to improve the generalizability of economic evaluations for 
its use in other settings, thus saving time and money. Therefore, guidelines have been developed by 
organizations such as the one developed by WHO on generalized CEA (Murray et al., 2000; 
Baltussen et al., 2002; Hutton & Baltussen, 2002). The aim is to reach a certain level of 
standardizations in the methodology used in economic evaluation, and thus to increase their 
transparency and transferability.  
The products of these attempts are usually league tables of different interventions ranked by 
increasing order of cost-utility ratio (C/U ratio).  League tables are useful for decision-makers, for 
them to select the interventions with the lowest C/U ratio. In order to decrease their potential 
dangers, Hauck, Smith & Goddard (2003:19-20) advise that league table of different interventions 
should use the same methodology, address the same condition, in the same setting, for one target 
population with preferably similar characteristics. 
 
2.2.5 Discounting benefits to present values 
In order to reflect our positive rate of time preference (we prefer to receive benefits earlier or to 
incur costs later), cost and benefits in economic evaluations are often discounted to present values. 
The future cost or benefit can then simply be converted to the present value by multiplying it by the 
discount factor 1/(1+r)n where r is the discount rate and n is the number of years from now 
(Johannesson, 1996:129). 
Debates on what discount rate should be used are still open. Nevertheless, a clear 
recommendation was given in 1996 by the Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine to 
use 3% discount rate in the reference case for both future costs and health effects. The panel argues 
that failure to discount health outcomes will lead to inconsistent choices over time, as for example 
delaying investments, which will always result in a program's becoming more cost-effective 
(Weinstein et al, 1996:1257).  
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On the other hand, discounting health outcomes at a positive rate may lead to major harm being 
imposed on future generation, especially when the effects may not be seen until the distant future. 
An outcome occurring in 64 years and discounted at 3% would be valued in the present day at only 
15.1% of its non-discounted value (at 6% it would be valued only 2.4%). As a result, policies that 
for example avoid the emergence of future antimicrobial resistance may seem much less cost-
effective than policies that reduce the transmission of already resistant organism, for which the 
benefits can be seen today (Smith et al., 2001). In order to avoid this, the WHO guideline for 
generalized CEA recommends health effects not to be discounted in the base-case analysis and a 
discount factor of 3% to be applied in sensitivity analysis (Baltussen et al., 2002:56). 
Consequently, discounting will remain having pros and cons, and the debate is likely to continue. 
However, a common view is that future CUA should include sensitivity analysis using rates in the 
range of 0% to 7% in order to achieve consistency and transferability across analyzes. 
 
2.2.6 Practical Barriers 
Hauck, Smith & Goddard (2003:16-7) point out an important barrier to the use of economic 
evaluations by policy makers. Politicians and researchers have different incentive structures, 
organizational cultures and beliefs, and objectives and approaches to work. On one side, 
researchers' careers depend upon publishing their findings in reputable journals. Research is usually 
conducted over a long time horizon and does not produce definitive answers to policy questions. 
On the other side, public policy-makers advance in their careers by providing timely solutions to 
policy questions and prefer unequivocal answers to policy questions. Different strategies are 
proposed to be adopted by researchers, in order to overcome these differences: making the research 
question specific without losing sight of policy relevance, making clear recommendations, 
identifying the implementation mechanism, use a language that is not difficult to understand, etc. 
 
2.3  SHORTCOMINGS REGARDING THE EQUITY DIMENSION 
As Drummond et al. (1997:44) point out, of primary concern from a policy viewpoint is the fact that 
economic evaluations do not usually incorporate into the analysis distributional concern on costs 
and consequences among different population groups. The identity of the recipient group (e.g. the 
poor, working mothers) may be an important factor - if not the motivation itself - for funding or 
subsidizing the programme. Sassi, Le Grand and Archard (2001:762-3) go even further, stating that 
there is no consensus in the United Kingdom's National Health System (NHS) on how to deal with 
policies that may cause a conflict between the goals of equity and efficiency and a lack of a clear and 
consistent definition of equity. "The equity versus efficiency dilemma has been virtually ignored in 
the political debate, often leading to inconsistent judgments in the development of health policies." 
They state that both researchers and policymakers share responsibility for the inconsistent pursuit 
of equity in the NHS. 
Why is there a failure to address the equity-efficiency trade-off? Nord (1999a:22) relates that in 
the seventies, it was assumed that the goodness of a health care system should be measured in terms 
of the amount of health that it produces. From this basic value judgment, the QALY model was 
developed with the assumption that societal value5 is a simple, outweighed sum of individual health 
                                                          
5   During the WHO's Global Conference on Summary Measures of Population Health, Nord (1999b:2) 
defined societal value as being "Judgements by representatives of society at large of the relative goodness of 
different health programs (determined by objective health gains, gains in subjectively perceived quality of life 
and concerns for fairness and equity across individuals)".  
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benefits, in other words, that society disregards how a given total amount of benefits is distributed 
across people. While there is increasing recognition among advocates of the QALY approach that 
this assumption is probably not quite true, there is little realization that it could indeed be very 
wrong. 
The consequences of this lack of equity concern are two fold. First a lack of distributional data, 
and second an important risk to increase health inequities.  
A systematic review of the literature on health care economic evaluations published in 1987-97 
showed that the studies reviewed did not provide enough information for decision makers to make 
their own judgments about the distributional impact of given policies. This distributional impact 
could have been either the characteristics of the population affected by the policy, or the policy's 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness in subgroups (Sassi, Le Grand & Archard, 2001:763). 
Dougherty (1994) analysed the implications of QALYs in allocation of resources for 
rehabilitation interventions. The study revealed that among three central ethical values in health care 
(freedom, happiness and fairness), QALYs may be useful in expanding patient freedom and in 
securing greater social happiness, but raise important problems of fairness and have a bias towards 
curative interventions.  The WHO Task Force on Health System Research Priorities for Equity in 
Health (WHO, 2004:18) stresses the danger of having QALY being valued the same way no matter 
to whom it accrues. In fact, the evidence shows that typical public health interventions applied in 
the traditional (non-equity-focused) way could in some cases increase health inequalities, since high-
income groups are generally better able to access and utilize services or knowledge from public 
health interventions. Therefore, an important task is to assist decision-makers in identifying and 
understanding the determinants to access to health services and information. 
A typical example is the NHS policy on cervical cancer screening. The aim of this NHS cervical 
screening programme introduced in England in 1990 was to maximize coverage, using powerful 
economic incentives to general practitioners. However, the fact that women at high risk, particularly 
those in disadvantaged socioeconomic groups, would have a low participation to this screening 
programme was not addressed. Consequently, not only was there much less invasive cancer avoided 
because screening rates were lower in the groups at risk (the poor), but the principle of improved 
horizontal health equity was not fulfilled. Only the principle of equity of access was, which usually 
increases health inequities6 (Sassi, Le Grand & Archard, 2001:762; Sassi, Archard & Le Grand:47-
54). 
Among many other equity concerns, age has been one of them, and at the heart of recent public 
debate about QALYs. In economic evaluations, older people generate less QALYs from health care 
than younger, other things being equal, as they do not have many more years to live in their life 
expectancy. This bias against the elderly occurring with the QALY methodology has been quite 
criticized (Robinson, 1999:16). There are three principal reasons for this bias, reported by Johri et al. 
(2004):  
• The important role QALYs accords to duration of benefits: as older persons have a potential 
duration of benefits necessarily limited, a ceiling effect may bias results against them. 
• QALYs' failure to adequately represent the often small health gains experienced by the 
elderly, who have limited potential for health improvement. Long term care for the elderly is 
likely to score badly in terms of QALYs gained when compared to more acute forms of care.  
• The potential impact of methodological choices concerning the discount rate on some costs: 
any feature that will increase benefits and decrease costs over the years will introduce a bias 
against the elderly. It is the case for low value of the discount rate and the exclusion of non-
                                                          
6   When the primary objective is health maximization, the rationing principle of need (versus fairness) implies 
that resources will be allocated in relation to the cost-effectiveness of competing procedures or subgroups. 
However, one has to keep in mind that need is not necessarily expressed as a demand, and demand is not 
necessarily followed by utilization. On the other hand, there can be a demand and utilization without a real 
underlying need for the particular services used (Maynard, 1999:7) 
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healthcare consumption during added life years.  
However, it could be argued that this bias against the elderly can be justified by the fact that 
general public itself favours young age groups over elderly for life-saving interventions - with the 
exception of very young children. Consequently, the QALY approach would go along side with 
general public preferences – apart for very young children. In practice, we can note that NHS policy 
for renal transplantation do not take into account these public preferences of ranking older children 
over younger ones, and gives priority to the youngest children. Sassi, Le Grand & Archard 
(2001:762-3) argue that these age priorities are not fully supported by evidence on effectiveness and 
efficiency grounds, but not even on equity grounds7. 
Dispersed and isolated rural communities are also a concern in terms of equity-efficiency trade-
off. The marginal cost-effectiveness of delivering health services for these communities is very 
unfavourable, as costs are higher than elsewhere (added cost for transport and basic services) and 
effectiveness of interventions is lower (lower utilization, as well as lower drug compliance). Still, on 
equity grounds, these communities may be among the highest priority to receive health services. In 
countries where dispersed, isolated communities exist, there should be a real concern to assess the 
trade-off between cost-effectiveness and universal coverage of health services (Bobadilla, 1998:43). 
In overall, the standard of work on economic evaluation has improved in recent years and there 
is a growing consensus among health economists about best practice and guidelines. However, it is 
clear from the above that there are still shortcomings regarding the equity dimension and that 
priorities can no longer be decided on pure efficiency criteria. Robinson (1999:18) believes that 
economic evaluations are much like a half-way through technology, and as such, its main 
contribution is likely to be an aid to decision-makers in specific circumstances, rather than a 
comprehensive technique for routine application. This issue will be discussed in chapter 4 and 5. 
                                                          
7   Many authors assume implicitly that society's concept of fairness should be translated into equity 
concepts by decision-makers, as we will see later.  
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3. EQUITY 
3.1 RATIONALE AND DEFINITION 
Equity has been an important stated or implied goal of health policy in many countries and by 
international health organizations for several decades. In 1978, the "Health for All by the Year 
2000" goal was launched at the well-known WHO conference in Alma Ata, making implicitly equity 
in health a priority. WHO launched subsequently a global initiative on Equity in Health and Health 
Care running between 1995 and 1998. Finally, equity concerns were also prominent in some parts 
of the 2000 Millennium Declaration, which gave rise to the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). 
As stated by the WHO Task Force on Health System Research Priorities for Equity in Health 
(2004:6-7), although impressive overall gains have been achieved in life expectancy and child 
survival during the second half of the 20th century, inequities in health status and in the health 
systems between more and less privileged groups within and between countries have persisted, and 
in many regions they even have begun to widen. Health equity has consequently emerged as an 
important theme in research and advocacy.  
Equity concepts try to define fairness in the distribution of health and health care, reducing 
inequalities between individuals or groups of individuals. It is the fair treatment of needs, regarding 
both the distribution of services and allocation of resources. 
Note that some health inequalities are still considered as fair by the general population, 
particularly when they result from biological differences8 or risky behaviour, such as smoking for 
example. Consequently, equity principles are mainly concerned by reducing inequalities resulting 
from an unfair treatment, including the unequal distribution of social and economic determinants of 
health such as income, education, employment, housing and healthy environment, to list the main 
ones. They also reflect a concern to reduce unequal opportunities to be healthy associated with 
membership to marginalized or socially disadvantaged groups, such as the poor; some racial, ethnic 
or religious groups; women; and rural residents (ibid, 2004:6-7). 
 Striving for equity in health care, which we are investigating here, is thus only one aspect of the 
wider concept of equity in health status, and usually implies that health care resources are allocated 
and received according to need -equity in delivery, and contributions to financing the system are made 
according to ability to pay - equity in financing. As we are exploring in this paper issues around 
priority-setting of health care interventions, and as this requires a previous effort of pooling funds, 
we will only take into consideration here equity in the delivery of health care, as opposed to equity 
in financing of the health system. 
Note also that, whether or not equity is desirable and how, is a pure value judgement. Much of 
the economics principles contained in this chapter deals with normative economics, as they involve a 
value judgement, in opposition to positive economics that can be tested by factual evidence and 
contain no value judgements. 
 
                                                          
8   Referring to the fact that biological differences are considered as less inequitable, Dolan (2005:19) states: 
"It is not at all obvious that to an ethicist that would be true, but to lay people it is: if it is not what society 
constructed, then it is not something that society needs to worry itself with." 
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3.2 DIFFERENT TYPES AND PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
ISSUES 
The equity concept needs to be spelled out, as there is not one unique definition of equity. Indeed, 
redistribution of resources to increase equity is an issue for which we encounter so many different 
positions – at least seven main ones9 – that any institution working around equity issues should 
primarily agree on the relevance of those following concepts to its work. The first three concepts 
presented are strongly related to the degree of severity of the initial health state. 
 
3.2.1 Allocation according to need 
This concept is the most well-known. A distribution according to need implies that individuals in 
equal need ought to be treated in the same way and individuals in greater need should be treated 
more favourably than those in lesser need (Lindholm et al., 1996:208).  
This concept is often referred as horizontal and vertical equity. Horizontal equity is the identical 
treatment of identical people, i.e. those in equal need should receive the same amount of health 
care. Vertical equity is the different treatment of different people in order to reduce the 
consequences of these innate differences, i.e. those in greater need may be expected to receive more 
health care (Begg, Fischer & Dornbusch, 2000:258; Jones, Culyer & Morga, 2002:108).  
One constrain that policy-makers are facing while trying to implement this concept is the one - 
already pointed out by Wagstaff in 1991 – that needs first have to be defined and established, 
"something that cannot be done until society has first decided what the desired health levels are of 
the persons concerned" (p. 32). There are different definitions of need in the literature. For some 
authors, the degree of need depends on the severity of illness (taking into account mortality, 
morbidity and/or socioeconomic factors, depending on the data available). However, this definition 
ignores what is medically possible. For others, needs exists only if a certain intervention is needed 
and effective to achieve a certain health outcome and if this outcome is endorsed by society as being 
worthwhile. Finally, Culyer and Wagstaff (1993) proposed an alternative definition of need as being 
the expenditure required to exhaust a patient's capacity to benefit from an intervention (in the 
future). Need is thus measured by the resources required for treatment and not by the patient's 
current level of ill-health. However, distribution according to the sole level of expenditure required 
to exhaust a patient's capacity to benefit may worsen the distribution of health or be considered as 
inequitable10, whereas a distribution designed to reduce inequalities in health would obviously 
improve the distribution of health (Jones, Culyer & Morga, 2002:110). Therefore, the definition of 
need - which did not yet reach a clear consensus - should include the severity of initial illness, as 
well as the amount of health-care resources required to exhaust the individual's capacity to benefit 
from health care.  
Policy-makers are facing another constrain when trying to implement the horizontal aspect of 
this concept of equity. Equal treatment for equal needs goes beyond equal access, and requires 
somehow that those who have an equal need for health care make equal use of health care. This is in 
fact not the case for different reasons. Ethically acceptable reasons would be individual preferences, 
                                                          
9    As provided by Hauck, Smith & Goddard (2003:22-35)   
10  An example is given by Hauck, Smith & Goddard (2003:26): a person A would need a comparably 
inexpensive treatment to avert sure death and live her life in good health and person B needs a comparably 
expensive continuous treatment to improve quality of life. Person A has greater need for health care, 
although she requires less expenditure. Need as being the expenditure required can therefore be considered as 
inequitable. 
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such as differences in lifestyle preferences or levels of risk aversion. Unacceptable reasons for 
differential use of health care would be a lack of information, for example. Consequently, this 
approach requires not only some more proactive efforts by policy-makers to overcome these 
unacceptable reasons for differential use of health care, but also that acceptable reasons would be 
overridden. This is why many policy-makers usually prefer the principle of equal access to health 
care for those in equal need (Oliver & Mossialos, 2004:656).  
In practice, allocation according to need often means simply allocating resources consistently on 
the basis of relative levels of expenditure on different types of people, often depending on 
geographical location. However, this distribution may perpetuate inefficiencies, as pointed out by 
Kaplan and Merson (2002). They report the example of the United States, where prevention 
resources from the federal government to the states flow is in proportion to newly reported AIDS 
cases. Perversely, under this type of proportional allocation, state health departments who are 
successful in reducing HIV infections – and, ultimately, in AIDS case – would lose funds, while 
health departments with ineffective programs that lead to the continued spread of HIV and AIDS 
would gain resources. Therefore, the authors argue for a middle ground that promotes both equity 
and efficiency, which would be allocating part of the prevention resources according to need, i.e. 
newly reported AIDS cases, and part according to new HIV infections prevented.  
Finally, Nord (1999) proposes an approach called "cost-value analysis", which incorporates 
equity concept into cost-utility analysis. This method is based on severity of illness and gives priority 
to the worst-off, as we will see in chapter 4.2.  
 
3.2.2 Rawl's Maximin principle 
John Rawls argued in 1971 that a just social contract is that which we would agree upon if we did 
not know in advance our financial situation, race, religion, or state of health. Operating under this 
"veil of ignorance" (to use Rawls' phrase) we can discern the form of a truly just society, since our 
judgment would not be clouded by knowledge of our own personal interests. Under this condition, 
rational and risk-averse individuals would choose a situation where the position or the well-being of 
the worst-off is maximized: that is, maximize the minimum, which resulted in the maximin principle.  
Regarding implementation issues, this principle is often taken as a justification for basing the 
resource allocation on the degree of severity of illnesses, supplemented by a criterion saying that the 
treatment should improve health. Different government-appointed commissions in several 
countries – Holland, Norway, New Zealand and Sweden – have adopted the position that severity 
of illness should continue to be the most important criterion for prioritizating between patients 
(Nord, 1999a:32). 
 
3.2.3 The rule of rescue 
This equity principle takes place at the individual level. It states that society and each individual have 
an ethical duty to do everything possible to help those in immediate life-threatening distress. 
Irrespective of the costs of treatment, it implies that the patient with the most serious condition is 
treated first.  
In terms of implementation, the rule of rescue (life-saving) principle is often the prevailing 
allocation principle in clinical practice, even when expected health gains are low (Hauck, Smith & 
Goddard, 2003:26-7). This may strongly diverge with other priority setting decisions, especially with 
those based on efficiency criteria, except if an effective triage and rationing is operated. 
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3.2.4 Egalitarism 
Egalitarianism implies that everybody should have identical health status, and therefore an equitable 
allocation of health care is one that gives rise to equality in health. Culyer and Wagstaff (1993) 
explored four definitions of equity in health care (equality of utilization, distribution according to 
need, equality of access, and equality in health) and concluded their analyzes by arguing that equality 
of health should be the dominant principle. 
This principle has many implication issues. The first one is that health care is not the only 
determinant of health, and for some groups it may even be a minor one in comparison with other 
proximal determinants of health such as nutrition, housing and working conditions, etc. Equality in 
health can thus not be reached only through allocation of health care. A second implication issue is 
that a distribution of resources designed only at reducing inequalities in health may not be 
considered as fair by the society, as it would not take into consideration other important values and 
concerns, such as number of people treated, age, social responsibilities (Nord, 1999a:73).  In 
addition, it may overlook societal concern for allowing people to realize their potential for health, 
also called fair innings, as we will see in chapter 4.1.2.  
A third concern is that it would require too many restrictions on the ways in which people may 
choose to live their lives, addressing individual responsibilities for the differences in health such as 
self-inflicted deprivations in health. 
Finally, this concept would imply that a situation of two people living in bad health is better than 
one person in bad health and one person in good health. With a given budget, this would require a 
levelling-down in health of healthy individuals towards the health of most unhealthy individual, 
which is not acceptable. 
A solution to the limitation of this principle is offered by the social welfare function, which will 
be described in chapter 4.1.1. 
 
3.2.5 Equality of access 
This equity principle is very close to the horizontal equity principle seen above in "allocation 
according to need", i.e. equal access for equal need. A clear definition of access and need is still 
necessary. Unfortunately, there is not yet a generally accepted definition on both concepts. Goddard 
and Smith (2001:1151) have defined access as "the ability to secure a specified range of services, at a 
specified level of quality, subject to a specified maximum level of personal inconvenience and cost, 
whilst in possession of a specified level of information". Nevertheless, equality of access needs to be 
considered as an equal opportunity given to individuals to use health services without regard to 
other characteristics such as their income, ability to pay, ethnicity, or area of residence.  Hence, to 
guarantee equality of access, health care costs - and also the time cost for traveling to the health care 
provider and waiting for treatment - would have to be reduced for low-income individuals until the 
product of price of health care and marginal utility is the same as it is for high-income individuals 
(Hauck, Smith & Goddard, 2003:27-8).  
In practical, equality of access remains the central objective of many health care systems and is 
often defined as provided through universal health insurance coverage or the absence of user 
charges. However, it is in reality difficult for policy-makers to fully operationalize this concept, as 
travel costs, opportunity costs of time, awareness of availability and efficacy of services – because of 
information skills, etc, vary considerably between individuals (Goddard and Smith, 2001:1151). In 
addition, it does not address ethically unacceptable reasons for differential access, such as lack of 
information, etc. Nevertheless, this approach is easier to operationalize and is more acceptable than 
a pure egalitarian one, as it respects the preferences of consumers and is consistent with welfare 
economics (Oliver & Mossialos, 2004:656; Lindholm et al., 1996:208).  
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3.2.6 Decent minimum and essential packages 
This is an access principle that establishes a portfolio of interventions for conditions and/or patient 
groups, agreeing on what should be or not be included. 
In order to implement an essential package of health care services, social judgement needs to be 
taken into account and not only efficiency criteria. Some propositions of an essential package have 
been made by the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, the World Bank or the 
Oregon list and will be addressed in chapter 4.3.6.  
 
3.2.7 Libertarianism 
Libertarianism promotes the equity concept that can be considered as the less equitable. For 
libertarians, the state has no right to intervene in the distribution of goods, wealth or health care. Its 
main task must be to enforce property rights. An individual is entitled to his or her possessions if 
acquired justly, through earnings or inheritance, for example. Consequently, differences in health 
status are not regarded as unfair, even if they are due to differences in housing conditions, income 
or lack of health care (Hauck, Smith & Goddard, 2003:31). 
Libertarianism has been applied so far only in selective groups of population or selected services. 
Certain interventions are regarded as non essential or not cost-effective, and are consequently 
excluded from an essential package of health care services covered by health insurance or from 
government-financed services.  
 
3.3 MEASURES OF INEQUITY 
Most of the work done by health economists in the measurement of equity in the delivery of health 
care has concentrated on the measurement of horizontal inequity, i.e. on whether different 
individuals in equal need consume different amounts of health care. This can be calculated using a 
concentration index, where the population is ranked by income and the proportion of health care 
used by particular income groups is compared to the proportion of illness that they experience. A 
positive value of this index means that high incomes use more health care than would be predicted 
by their level of need, suggesting that the delivery of health care favours the rich. (Jones, Culyer & 
Morga, 2002:113,117).  
The fact that there has been little analysis of vertical equity in the use of health care is not 
surprising and can be explained by the fact that we would need to use need variables. As Morris, 
Sutton and Gravelle (2005:1251-2) stress it out, the model would require value judgments about 
which variables are the need variables, as well as value judgments about the way in which use is 
supposed to vary among individuals with different needs.  
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3.4 WHICH PRINCIPLE(S) SHOULD PREVAIL ? 
As seen earlier, the understanding of equity is pure value judgment. Le Grand (1996:152) shed an 
interesting light on this tension, when he states that, for a rationing of health care to be assessed as 
equitable, it should not yield outcomes that offend against moral intuitions concerning what is 
equitable, fair or just – all terms being synonymous. Even though this seems, on methodological 
grounds, to be an unscientific procedure for evaluating principles, any decision-making regarded as 
seriously inequitable would not be sustainable in the long term. 
As stated by WHO in its World Health Report 2005 (141-143), it is important that stakeholders 
from civil society are represented in the priority-setting process, in order for less popular and 
politically sensitive aspects – and in particular within maternal, newborn and child health – not to be 
forgotten. This will also give a chance that social determinants like gender inequality, poverty and 
exclusion are tackled in the health sector policies and included in universal coverage systems. 
Therefore, decision makers often attempt to seek public views of what is considered as a fair 
distribution of health and health care, on the basis of researchers' work. The attempts to elicit equity 
concepts from the general public are numerous11 and empirical data is clear: societal values give 
strong priority to treating severely ill patients even when less cost-effective (Kapiriri, Arnesen and 
Norheim, 2004), younger age groups for life-saving interventions and infertility treatment (Johri et 
al., 2004). In addition, there is a consensus for the idea that we should discriminate in favour of 
those with dependants (Dolan et al., 2005:205) and redirect considerable resources towards people 
of low social class or with adverse health prospects, at the expense of other national health system 
activity (Hauck, Smith & Goddard, 2003:33). 
Translating these preferences into policy is quite challenging for policy-makers. Indeed, as 
argued by Hauck, Smith & Goddard (2003:34), decision makers at different level of the health care 
system may follow different equity concepts from those just described. In particular, politicians 
working at national or regional administrative level and clinicians at the individual level work in 
different environments and are subject to different incentives. In any case, decisions at the clinical 
level are crucial for the implementation of a chosen equity concept, and therefore policy-makers at 
national or regional level would have to set up incentive structures and guidelines, as well as 
introduce audit procedures in order to implement successfully chosen equity concept(s).  
As seen earlier, the experience shows that in clinical practice, the prevailing equity principle 
remains the rule of rescue. At national and regional level, policy-makers tend to favour allocation 
according to need and equality of access12. This choice still often result in defining an essential package of 
health care services covered by health insurance or from government-financed services, as it is the 
easier approach to operationalize these concepts and is more acceptable than a pure egalitarian one. 
This, however, does not solve the problem of differential access (due to awareness of availability 
and efficacy of services – because of information skills, travel costs, opportunity costs of time, etc.) 
which remains ethically unacceptable reasons for restricted access to health care. In addition, it does 
not automatically translate into societal preferences such as age, severity, disadvantaged populations 
or individuals with dependants. 
We will not address in this paper the practical constraints – such as majority rule voting, 
                                                          
11   For example, a broad national survey on public preferences for prioritization in organ transplant is 
currently being conducted in Switzerland, including questions on preferences about the potential beneficiary's 
age, social responsibilities, etc. [from personal experience as being part of the sample surveyed]. 
12   By instance, seven Ministers of Health (Chile, Germany, Greece, New Zealand, Slovenia, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom) agreed in 2003 that the most appropriate principle of equity for the health-care policy-
maker to pursue was the horizontal equity one, i.e. equal access to health care for those in equal need, as it 
does not discriminate between people who are already ill on the basis of non-health factors such as income 
or education, and as it respects differences in lifestyle preferences and levels of risk aversion for differential 
health-care utilization (Oliver and Mossialos, 2004:655-6). 
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lobbying, donor constraints, bureaucratic issues, etc. – that policy-makers are facing when trying to 
implement these concepts in allocation policies, as this is an equally broad concern. What we need 
to review and assess are methodologies and tools for incorporating equity concepts into (a) cost-
utility analysis and (b) other priority-setting tools which include efficiency criteria. We will as well 
consider what still needs to be done for it to become operational. Nevertheless, practical constraints 
faced by policy-makers and emerging from donor conditionality, rule voting, etc remain a major 
issue that deserve more scrutiny. 
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4. PRIORITY SETTING AND EQUITY CONCERNS  
In this chapter, we will review the three main trends arising in the health economic literature and 
concerning the necessity to incorporate equity concerns in the priority setting process. The first 
trend is to add equity weights to utility measures of health interventions such as QALYs. The 
second is a person trade-off technique for valuing outcomes from a societal perspective that was 
designed by the researcher Erik Nord and called cost-value analysis. Finally, the third one is a set of 
priority setting tools that take into account incentives and constraints directly faced by policy-
makers. 
4.1 EQUITY WEIGHTED UTILITY GAINS 
In the traditional equally-weighted QALY seen in the second chapter, a QALY accruing to any 
individual is considered as of equal worth, whatever the personal characteristics of that individual. 
This, however, does not capture correctly the societal values of equity seen in chapter 3. Could then 
health utility measures such as QALY be made more valid by using more appropriate weights?  
There are two tendencies among economists when seeking greater quantification of the equity-
efficiency trade-offs. The first one is theoretical, through the use of a social welfare function. The 
second one is more empirical, through the use of questionnaire methods that will allow them to 
subsequently assign equity weights.  The latter will then be used to allocate resources in such a way 
as to favour certain populations or conditions, such as young people against old people (age-
weighting), or severe conditions as against those with less severe ones (severity-weighting), etc. Note 
that it is broadly accepted through the literature that the public should decide on the equity weights, 
as the latter are subject to value judgments.  
Before we see in more details some theoretical grounds and some practical application of 
different equity weights, we shall acknowledge the fact that among non-health factors, age – and to 
a certain extend (dis)ability – are often the only factors which are receiving attention in the literature 
on equity weighting. Whether social exclusion occurring from other factors such as gender, 
ethnicity/racial, social class or geographical location (urban/rural) should be weighted still needs to 
be considered. It could be argued that socially and/or geographically excluded individuals tend to 
experience higher severity health status and would thus be compensated through the severity-
weighting process. This concern deserves further research. 
 
4.1.1 The social welfare function and health care needs 
Some health economists (Wagstaff, 1991; Williams & Cookson, 2000; Folland, Goodman & Stano, 
2001) have used the social welfare function (SWF) to express the equity-efficiency trade-off. Instead 
of having the SWF defined over utility levels – and thus the two axis representing utilities – the 
function uses the QALYs that remain in the life expectancy of the community as a measure of 
health13. As we will see first graphically and then in the function itself, the SWF reflects the society's 
aversion to inequality, but still allows some trade-off between total health equality and health 
                                                          
13  Note that it is a typical extra-welfarist approach, as opposed to the classical welfare economics. For extra-
welfarists, health – and not utility – is the crucial outcome of health policy. 
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maximization in the society. 
Figure 2 (Wagstaff, 1991:37) shows a social welfare function and a health frontier. A and B are 
two individuals or groups of individuals with some similarities. The point m represents the same 
number of QALYs that A and B would enjoy without treatment. The health frontier represents the 
maximum amount of health outcome that can be produced with the resources available and thus 
points on the frontier are said to be Pareto efficient, i.e. it is impossible to improve the level of welfare 
of one party (A or B) without hurting the welfare level of the other party. Its shape depends on the 
health care costs to society, but also shows different potential between individuals or groups of 
individuals. Here B can be treated at lower cost than A and/or has a better capacity to benefit from 
that health care than A14. So both point p and q are technically efficient, but point p represents the 
level where the community's health is maximized15 and q where health is equally distributed, as it 
crosses the 45° line from the origin (same health outcomes). Finally, point s is located somewhere 
in-between the health maximization point and the equity maximization point.  
 
Figure 4.1: Health frontier and social welfare maximization 
Source: Wagstaff A, 1991:37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We will now describe how to decide on the localization of point s. This point is precisely at the 
tangency between the health frontier and the social welfare function, i.e. where the social welfare is 
maximized. Wagstaff (1991:35) defines the isoelastic social welfare function as such: 
W = (τ-1)-1[(αhA)
1-τ+(βhB)
1-τ],   τ≠1 
where W is the level of social welfare associated with the health distribution [hA,hB] after 
intervention. The parameters α and β are the weights to be attached to respectively A's and B's 
health.  The health of worse-off individuals or groups would receive a higher weight in the function, 
which would change the social welfare contour gradient. The parameter τ is the degree aversion to 
inequality in health outcomes. The greater the community's aversion to inequalities between A and 
B, the stronger will be the curvature of each social welfare contour.  
If τ >0 and τ→ ∞, the contour becomes L-shapes with its corner on the 45° line. It would then 
concern only the health of the least healthy person (cf. Rawlsian equity in chapter 3.2.2). At the 
contrary, in the case where τ = 0 and α=β=1 (no aversion to inequality in health and no weight), we 
are back to point p health maximization that is considered in the traditional QALY approach. 
In his article on intergenerational equity, Williams (1997) gives an example and provides a table 
                                                          
14  This could be for different reasons, such as age, education impacting on compliance, income impacting on 
nutrition status, etc. 
15   At this point, the slope is – 1, i.e. the marginal cost of one QALY is the same for A and B. 
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of equity weights, which depend on the discrepancy size and the inequality aversion τ. 
 
4.1.2 Societal concern for age 
As we saw earlier, cost-utility analysis may introduce a bias against the elderly, as older people 
generate less QALYs from health care than younger and have less years to leave in their life 
expectancy. This bias has been widely criticized. 
However, the general public show a preference towards the younger individuals in term of life-
saving treatment, which would somehow reflect the bias produced by the QALY methodology. 
Studies conducted in Wales, Sweden, Holland and Japan have shown that society tend to accord 
priority to treatments favouring children and young adults over elderly people. Another study done 
in Australia found that higher preference to projects directed at younger patients where given for 
both life-extending and health improving treatments. However, the existing evidence does not give 
a clear answer whether society values treating the young more highly than treating the elderly for 
different reasons than the difference in life expectancy (Nord, 1999a: 57-61).  
A study conducted over 721 individuals in Cardiff City chose to treat the younger patients for a 
life-threatening condition: 94% preferred to treat a 5 year-old rather than a 70 year-old (1% the 
opposite and 5% unanswered) and 80% preferred to treat a 35 year-old rather than a 60 year-old 
(7% the opposite and 13% unanswered). However, when choosing between a 2 year-old and a 8 
year-old, the choice was for the older by a ratio of 5:3, with 46% unanswered (Lewis & Charny, 
1989:29). The same kind of preference was found in a study conducted in the Netherlands among 
30 students and 35 elderly people about transplantation for end-stage renal disease. Respondents 
found health in the early periods of life to be twice as important as in the last decade of life, except 
for the 5 year-old children. Health at age 35 had a utility somewhere between these two extremes. 
The fact that the responses of the elderly people showed remarkable resemblance to the students' 
responses suggests that the results reflect a general ethical standard (Busschbach, Hessing & de 
Charro, 1993). 
Nevertheless, preferences can be differentiated according to the treatment type. Johri et al. 
(2004) investigated among the general US public whether the perceived importance of age (35 
versus 65) in resource allocation decisions differs among intervention-types. For this, they used six 
types of interventions. They found out that the general public favoured young age groups for life-
saving interventions as well as infertility treatment or organ transplantation, but showed no age 
preference for the palliative care. The difference between the scenarios was statistically significant. 
The intervention showing the least concern on age preference was in treating depression and for 
pain relief, i.e. the same importance in priority setting should be given to young and old when 
treating depression or pain.  
Therefore, we could imagine that for interventions such as treating depression or relieving from 
pain, QALYs could be weighted inversely by age in such a way as to offset the age effect seen 
above.  
Nevertheless, two tendencies go in the exact opposite direction and advocate for even greater 
discrimination against the elderly than what would be dictated by efficiency objectives, and thus 
would assign age-weights that would increase the QALY bias already described.  
The first one is Williams, who has raised an interesting debate with his famous and controversial 
article in 1997 about the concept of a ‘fair innings’. This concept reflects an equity concern which is 
society's aversion to lifetime health inequalities. His feeling is that everyone is entitled to some 
‘normal’ span of health and that "anyone failing to achieve this has been cheated, whilst anyone 
getting more than this is ‘living on borrowed time’". In short, he advocates that somebody like 
himself who had a "fair innings", i.e. had a good quality of life for a long time, "should not expect 
to have as much spent on a health improvement for them as would be spent to generate the same 
benefit for someone who is unlikely ever to attain what we have already enjoyed". This would – 
Williams argues – generate more intergenerational equity. Nord (2004:2) considers that this would 
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be a fair proposal only with respect to interventions aimed at gaining life years. He states that giving 
priority to young people over old people when it comes to functional improvements and symptom 
relief for non-fatal conditions would run "counter to both moral intuitions and official government 
guidelines in Norway and Sweden" (Ibid, 2005:262). 
The second proposition on age-weighting comes from Murray and Lopez (1996) with the well-
known Global Burden of Disease (GBD) assessment, in which individuals were receiving weights 
according to their expected economic, social and family (such as caring for children) contribution.  
The 20 to 50 years old individuals were receiving highest weights in their study, while the elderly 
and very young children were receiving the lowest weights. Le Grand (1996: 158) remarks that if 
those with dependents are given priority for treatment, other things being equal, the welfare of the 
community as a whole is likely to be raised. A review of 64 studies that report empirical data 
showed that there is a consensus for the idea that we should discriminate in favour of those with 
dependants (Dolan et al., 2005:205). Even though these highest weights for 20 to 50 years old 
individuals were used only in a summary measure of the population health (the GBD) at that time, 
many authors criticized this approach, stating that it does not reflect societal concern for 
disadvantaged members of society. This approach was not used subsequently in the "development 
of WHO guidelines on generalized cost-effectiveness analysis" by Murray et al (2000) for reasons of 
transferability, as well as in any other equity weighting.  
However, in view of what has been described earlier in Johri's et al. work (2004), both Williams 
and Murray & Lopez approaches would not reflect societal values, at least for some interventions 
such as treatment of depression or health interventions relieving from pain.  
In general, different studies (Richardson, 1999; Johri et al., 2004) conclude by stating that the 
application of age weights to utility measures such as QALY is premature and that ethical and 
empirical enquiry be conducted. Deliberative weights – as opposed to spontaneous weights – should be 
used, i.e. "weights that are constructed from the responses of people who have been encouraged to 
deliberate upon the issues and their implications" (Richardson, 1999:11). 
 
4.1.3 Societal concern for severity and rule of rescue 
A strong ethical concern not reflected within economic evaluations is that of severity and rule of 
rescue. As seen earlier, society tends to value more gains in favour of worse off people, i.e. patients 
having the lower without-intervention-initial-condition or life-threatening conditions. This is also 
reflected in the vertical equity (including the first three equity concepts seen earlier), i.e. those in 
greater need may be expected to receive more health care. In cost-utility analysis, the cost per 
QALY ratio obtained in treating a patient in life-threatening distress is relatively high (costly), as 
benefits are likely to be low – often deaths cannot be averted despite all efforts – and costs are 
comparably high. Consequently, severity and rule of rescue concerns are most of the time 
incompatible with the objective of health maximization and efficiency.  
Hoel (2001:9-10) shows theoretically that the rule of cost-effectiveness is optimal only if people 
are risk neutral with respect to the number of live years they live. With risk aversion, the optimal 
allocation of health expenditures changes and: 
• More resources should be allocated to health cases for which the expected outcomes – even 
after treatment – are worse than average. 
• Under constant risk aversion, more resources should be allocated to cases for which the 
health outcome is more uncertain than average, unless the treatment increases this 
uncertainty. 
Stolk et al. (2004) are using the concept of proportional shortfall in order to adjust valuations of 
QALYs with equity concern of severity and the 'fair innings' approach. They measured inequality 
through the ratio of QALYs that patients would loose without the intervention over the QALYs 
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that would remain in absence of the disease, considering their life expectancy. The application of 
this concept would result in the expansion of the resources for treatment of the worse-off patients. 
The authors note that this concept would still need some refinements - such as age weights, etc - in 
order to better reflect social preferences for the distribution of health care resources. 
Conventional QALYs not measuring social value is due to the fact that their weights represent 
an aggregation of preferences and trade-offs that individuals hold for their own health. "That is, 
they [QALYs] represent the trade-offs among various living states and between living states and 
death that the individuals would want for themselves. In aggregating, all persons preferences are 
considered equal (…) and so the resulting QALY is equity neutral" (Drummond, 1997: 182). 
However, researchers have found that an approach using person trade-offs (PTO) and asking the 
general public how many patients of type A should be cured to be equivalent in social value to 
curing 10 patients of type B, the results do not match conventional QALYs, but reflect equity 
considerations such as help the sicker people first. 
Nord (1999:32-38) and other authors conducted numerous studies in order to measure PTO for 
different degree of severity of illness. In order to simplify the questions, four classes of outcomes 
were set: 
A. Life saving: saving a person's life and restoring him/her to a healthy one. In QALY, this 
would correspond to a value from 0 (death) to 1 (full health). 
B. Severe: Curing a person with a severe problem, for instance, a person who has to sit in a 
wheelchair, has pain most of the time, and is unable to work. 
C. Considerable: Curing a person with a considerable problem, for instance, a person who 
must use crutches to walk, has light pain intermittently, and is unable to work. 
D. Moderate: Curing a person with a moderate problem, for instance, a person who has 
difficulty moving about outdoors and slight discomfort, but is able to do some work and 
has only minor difficulties at home. 
 
Results by Nord (1999:38) from a PTO enquiries in Australia, England, Norway, Spain and the 
United States about future treatment capacity showed that the society would value curing 3 to 6 
person in a B state for one person in a A state, i.e. were willing save one life at the price of three to 
six severely ill person not cured. The societal appreciation of life-saving (A) was also 10 to 15 times 
as high as that of class C outcomes, and 50 to 200 times as high as that of class D outcomes. 
Consequently, the general public would value curing a person in a moderate state of health (D) 
1/50 to 1/200 of the value of saving person's life. The state D could then be assigned a societal 
utility gain of curing this person of 0.02 (=1/50) to 0.005 (=1/200) versus 1 for a life saving utility. 
From a rule of thumb, health state of a person with a moderate problem could then be roughly 
assigned a value of 0.98-0.995 (1 being in perfect health). Here below is a table of suggested values 
per degree of severity, compared to utilities that would be given to each of theses states through the 
York EuroQol TTO: 
 
 Degree of severity Societal value EuroQol TTO 
 Moderate problem 0.99 0.80 
 Considerable problem 0.92 0.45 
 Severe problem 0.75 0.20 
 Life-threatening condition 0.00 0.00 
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We can derive from this the QALY gain per year obtained by curing a person for each degree of 
severity through a simple (1-x) calculation: 
 Degree of severity Societal value Standard value 
  of QALYs of QALYs 
 Moderate problem 0.01 0.20 
 Considerable problem 0.08 0.55 
 Severe problem 0.25 0.80 
 Life-threatening condition 1.00 1.00 
 
We can conclude from the two types of utility above that societal values (first column) are far 
from the standard QALY gains (second column), which are calculated – as seen before – on the 
basis of individual utilities. However, standard QALYs would become roughly right if they were 
multiplied by fractions (weights) that would somehow reflect societal value of severity, which Nord 
did: 
 Degree of severity Standard value  x Severity  = Weighted QALYs  
  of QALYs  weights 
 Moderate problem 0.20 x 1/20 = 0.01 
 Considerable problem 0.55 x 1/7 = 0.08 
 Severe problem 0.80 x 1/3 = 0.27 
 Life-threatening condition 1.00 x 1 = 1.00 
 
We can see from above that it is technically possible to weight the standard QALY to obtain an 
outcome that would fit societal preferences for resource allocation. However, two problems would 
remain. First, this severity-weighting is not taking other equity concerns into consideration. Second, 
standard cost-utility analysis is somehow already complex, and to weight the standard value of 
QALYs would further complicate them. This would discourage even more policy-makers from 
using this technique in prioritizing interventions. 
 
4.1.4 Societal concern for capacity to benefit or potentials for health 
In cost-utility analysis, QALYs are being used as measures of capacity to benefit from health care 
and thus reflect all differences in that capacity among individuals. From a positive point of view, the 
QALY approach makes the problems of equity even more transparent and addressable, through 
emphasizing the differences in capacity to benefit. From the negative side, the QALY approach 
implies overly strong discrimination between patient groups in favour of those with the greater 
capacity to benefit.  
The QALY approach – valuing health outcomes in terms of individual utilities – assumes that 
the societal value of an intervention is proportional to the size of the health improvement 
(utilitarian view). The ethical theory suggests that society gives equal priority to groups with 
different capacity to benefit or potential for health, meaning that disabled and chronically ill people 
should have the same opportunities and resource allocation (egalitarian view). 
The results from a study in 1973 in New York City showed that graduate students and health 
leaders were considering saving the life of a no disabled person approximately equivalent to saving 
the lives of three people in wheelchairs unable to work. Recent studies fortunately suggest that the 
egalitarian-ethical views tend to be now the majority, particularly among women, older people, 
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those with less than college-level education, and members of parties to the left. Even, public 
opinion surveys in a number of industrialized countries show that – as long as the benefits are 
substantial – society does not wish to give strong priority to those with great capacity to benefit 
over those with a lesser capacity for the same severity of illness (Nord, 1999a:38-42). 
A salient ethical problem has been identified in the literature concerning both QALYs and 
DALYs. Different authors (Nord, 1999b; Arnesen and Nord, 1999; Rock, 2000: 412-3) stress the 
fact that when gains in life years are concerned, the value of life extension in chronically ill or 
disabled people is smaller than the value of life extension in otherwise perfectly able-bodied person. 
It is in most people’s eyes unethical and offensive, and in conflict with the idea of everybody having 
the same right to have their life protected. A proposed solution is to count each lost or gained life 
year as 1 irrespective of disability as long as life is preferred to being dead by the person concerned. 
This is already the case in the calculation of burden of disease and value of health outcomes in 
terms of DALYs/QALYs lost.  
 
4.1.5 Practical difficulties 
Dowie (2001) considers that there is no arithmetic difficulty in adapting the QALY concept to 
another system where QALYs would be weighted differently according to the potential 
beneficiaries' characteristics, such as age, sex, race, severity of disease, or even how many QALYs 
they have already enjoyed during their lifetime. However, as individuals have multiple 
characteristics, "the practical difficulty of achieving a coherent overall allocation will increase 
exponentially with the number of characteristics on which such differential weighting is sought and 
in the end these practical difficulties may rule out anything other than equal weights." (p. 7) 
Another difficulty raised by Williams & Cookson (2000) is that individuals do not subscribe to 
just one pure theory of equity that would be applicable in all circumstances. They rather mix 
different concepts of equity as well as vary the chosen equity concept from one context to another. 
In addition to that, respondents are not used to these highly focused person trade-off (PTO) 
questions that economists tend to ask (such as how many patients of type A should be cured to be equivalent 
in social value to curing 10 patients of type B). Consequently, they may interpret the PTO questions in 
unpredicted ways and bring wider considerations that the economist wanted to set aside. "The great 
challenge is to bridge the gap between the economic requirement to estimate precisely targeted 
equity-efficiency trade-offs, and the psychological capabilities of respondents to think about equity 
and efficiency in such a tightly defined manner." (p. 1905). More recommendations for research to 
overcome this difficulty will be given in chapter 5. 
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4.2 COST-VALUE ANALYSIS 
In order to overcome the lack of societal concern about fairness encountered in the QALY 
approach, Nord et al. (1999) proposed a model that they would call "cost-value analysis". In a 
separate publication, Nord (1999) specifies that this model was primarily designed "as an aid to 
reflection about setting priorities across a wide range of health interventions that compete for scarce 
resources in public and private health insurance plans" (p. 141). 
This points again to the rough table seen earlier, where the first column shows societal 
valuations modelled from international studies using person trade-off (PTO). The second column 
still shows utilities assigned through the York EuroQol TTO tariff for each degree of severity. 
 
 Degree of severity Societal value Standard value 
  of QALYs of QALYs 
 Moderate problem 0.01 0.20 
 Considerable problem 0.08 0.55 
 Severe problem 0.25 0.80 
 Life-threatening condition 1.00 1.00 
 
Nord et al's new proposal is thus to compress mild and moderate states of illness to the upper 
end of the 0-1 value scale. As we can see, this proposal differs considerably from the traditional 
QALYs.  
The table 4.1 shows in a more detailed way values – which are not utilities – representing societal 
preferences. The purpose is that severity of illness receives much greater weight, and at the same time 
groups with lesser potentials for health would be significantly less discriminated.  
This model also allows chronically-ill and disabled people to receive the same number of 
QALYs that healthy people would receive for any life-extending program, as seen earlier about 
potential for health. 
 
Table 4.1: Values for different levels of severity of illness, adapted from Nord (1999:119) 
 
Level 
1. Healthy 
2. Slight problem 
 
3. Moderate problem 
 
4. Considerable problem 
 
5. Severe problem 
 
6. Very severe problem 
 
7. Completely disabled 
8. Dead 
 
Examples 
 
Can move about anywhere but has difficulties walking more 
than a kilometre 
Can move about without difficulties at home but has 
difficulties on stairs and outdoors 
Moves about with difficulty at home; needs assistance on stairs 
and outdoors 
Can sit. Needs help to move about – both at home and 
outdoors 
To some degree bedridden; can sit in a chair part of the day if 
helped by others 
Permanently bedridden 
 
 
Value 
1.00 
0.9999 
 
0.99 
 
0.92 
 
0.80 
 
0.65 
 
0.40 
0.00 
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In order to encapsulate these two concerns for fairness (severity and potential for health) and to 
better the difference between utility and value, Nord et al. (1999:32-3) propose a simple 
multiplicative model: 
SV = dU x SW x PW 
where SV stands for societal value, dU represents the utility gain (U2 – U1, i.e. after – before 
treatment utilities), SW is a weight determined by the severity of the initial condition and PW is a 
weight determined by the potential for health.  
We will not go through all tables and calculations proposed for the two weights. However, this 
model might help us to understand better how this model defers from the traditional QALY one. 
The first step is very similar to the QALY approach, as it consists of measuring the severity of 
different health states in terms of utility (U1 and U2) that will allow us to estimate the utility gains 
(dU) associated with different health interventions. One difference is – as Nord (1999) states – that: 
"these data should be elicited from patients who actually are – or were – in those states rather than 
by asking samples of the general population to imagine themselves in different states of illness". 
The second step is to assign weights to these different utility gains, such as described before. The 
difference here with the traditional QALY approach, is that person trade-off is used to measure 
distributive preferences in the general population to estimate societal value.  
There are a number of problems with the cost-value approach. However, cost-value analysis 
could effectively help decision makers in their priority setting process after more empirical research 
is conducted, resulting in the production of a more sophisticated table of value than the one 
proposed by Nord et al. (see table 4.1), but still including a strong upper end compression. This 
table of value can be considered as the main input from Nord et al., and is an important step 
forward comparing to the earlier propositions under the "equity weighted utility gains" review in the 
previous section 4.1. 
In 2003, Østerdal pointed out some difficulties in this cost-value analysis approach. He stated 
that using the societal value proposed would give unappealing and less intuitive social orderings of 
health care allocations. In addition to that, he felt that the combined effects of the severity- and 
potential weights are difficult to see through (pp. 248-9). In reply to this, Nord et al. (2003:252) 
conceded that it may be seen as unfortunate to try to encapsulate several different determinants of 
value in one single set of numbers. It might be preferable to make the nature and the extent of the 
efficiency-equity trade-off explicit by adopting a decomposed approach, in which separate equity 
weights (here severity- and potential weights) are introduced for distributive concerns. The authors 
concluded by stating:  
"Models are also simplifications. The interesting question is not whether proposed new valuation 
models are flawless, but whether they: (a) are improvements over existing models; and (b) sufficiently 
accurate to be perceived as useful by people engaged in discourse and decisions about resource 
allocation. We feel confident that the various approaches outlined above to incorporating concerns for 
fairness in economic evaluation are significant improvements over the conventional QALY model. But 
we agree with Østerdal that more research into cost-value analysis, including its usefulness to decision 
makers, is desirable" (ibid, 2003:253) 
Finally, we can say that the cost-value analysis approach is not perfect and much work remains to 
be done to refine this model. The authors admit it and in fact list eight concerns to be addressed in 
future research in the discussion part of their article (Nord et al, 1999). But the authors hope that 
decision makers will find the model – as the work progresses – each time more useful, and that it 
will allow them to guide their reflection in their priority setting activities.  
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4.3 FRAMEWORKS FOR EQUITABLE ALLOCATION DECISIONS 
Seven tools or frameworks which incorporate equity criteria when setting priorities are described or 
listed below.  
 
4.3.1 Decision tree for public resource allocation to health care 
The first tool, from Musgrove (1999), is a decision tree to guide policy-makers in the choice of 
health services to spend public money on. The author reviews nine different criteria based on:  
• Economic efficiency (public goods, externalities, catastrophic cost, cost-effectiveness) 
• Ethical reasons (poverty, horizontal and vertical equity, rule of rescue) 
• Political considerations (demands by the populace) 
The first three ethical reasons are not included in the decision tree below, as they involve explicit 
comparisons among people and among services (see also chapter 3.2.1. and 3.2.3.). Each remaining 
criterion has to be treated in the appropriate sequence as follows: 
 
Figure 4.2: Decision tree for public resource allocation to health care 
Source: Musgrove (1999), p. 220 
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Therefore, when deciding which health services to spend public money on, cost-effectiveness is 
the decisive criteria in only one case; when the health service can be considered as a public or semi-
public good. When this is not the case, all nine criteria have to be considered and treated in the 
proper sequence, taking into account whether they are consistent or in conflict. The other scenarios 
justifying public spending are: when there are significant externalities, inadequate demand and the 
intervention is cost-effective; for catastrophically costly care, when contributory insurance will not 
work effectively or there are good reasons to finance insurance publicly; and for cost-effective 
interventions which disproportionately benefit the poor. The author concludes by stating that 
"interventions which do not pass these tests either are not worth paying for at all, or they can be left 
to regulated private markets to finance because the costs are bearable without insurance, or private 
contributory insurance is feasible" (p. 222). 
Note that the article does not provide a clear definition of public good. However, it is argued 
that an intervention does not qualify as a pure public good if private purchasers are willing to pay 
for it. As from Begg, Fischer & Dornbusch (2000), "a public good, even if consumed by one 
person, can still be consumed by other people. (…) In fact, for a pure public good we must all 
necessarily consume the same quantity, namely, whatever quantity is supplied in the aggregate." (pp. 
281-2). We can assume that what Musgrove contends is that private purchasers would not pay for 
something which should be or is already provided to everybody through public funds. 
 
4.3.2 Use of prioritization score of health interventions  
The second tool is proposed by James et al. (2004; 2005), and consists in the use of prioritization 
scores assigned to different health interventions and taking into consideration different categories 
of criteria. It is a simple framework that combines both weighting of efficiency and equity criteria 
(in percentage according to the value attached to each criteria), and the score of a particular 
intervention to fulfil each of these criteria (ranging from 0 to 1). 
The prioritization score of a health intervention A (PRSA) is defined by: 
PRSA = α [Equity] + (1-α) [Efficiency] 
where the efficiency score is ranging from 0 to 1 depending on the cost-effectiveness of the 
intervention and 
Equity = β [severe health conditions] + (1-β) [poverty reduction] 
where α and β are weights attached to each different scores. 
The authors provide some illustrative comparisons between interventions. One of them is for 
example the treatment of multi-drug resistant TB. This intervention is cost-effective and thus can 
be assigned a score of 0.5 – in-between not cost-effective and very cost-effective. The severity score 
of this health condition is 1 (very severe) and the poverty reduction score is 1 (positive).  
If a pure efficiency rating is chosen, then α = 0 and the PRS of this intervention is 0.5.   
In comparison, a situation where equal weights for efficiency and equity are given and both severity 
and poverty criteria are also given equal weights, the efficiency criteria would be weighted 50%, 
severe health conditions 25% and poverty reduction 25%. Consequently,  α = β = 0.5 and 
PRS  = 0.5 [0.5 (1) + 0.5 (1)] + 0.5 (0.5) = 0.5 + 0.25 = 0.75. 
In conclusion, the treatment of multi-drug resistant TB may not be included in a basic or 
essential package of health services if the prioritization decision is based only on efficiency criteria 
(PSA = 0.5) but will more probably be included if the decision is also based on equity criteria  
(PSA = 0.75). 16 
                                                          
16    For further details and illustration, see James et al. (2004; 2005). 
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4.3.3 Log scale cost-effectiveness highlighting five equity criteria 
The log scale below in figure 4.3. was proposed by James et al. (2003) in an earlier draft and that – as 
far as I know – was not published. It is a very practical visual tool for policy-makers to prioritize 
among interventions in an explicit manner. Each point represents a different health intervention. All 
points on the line drawn obliquely at the south-east extreme, i.e. the bottom line, have the same 
cost-effectiveness ratio, such as one international $ per DALY gained, for example. The 
interventions chosen below are respecting horizontal equity (targeting rural populations), vertical 
equity (targeting the poor), and other equity concerns. 
 
Figure 4.3.: Log scale cost-effectiveness highlighting five equity criteria 
                  Source: James et al. (2003), p. 11 
 
 
 
 
 
Costs (log scale)
DALYs averted (log scale)
•Interventions with significant positive impact on an individual’s health
and/or on severe health conditions
•Interventions that target the poor
•Interventions that target (for example) rural populations
•Interventions that target the young
•Interventions that are deemed to be uniquely the individual’s responsibility
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Box 4.1: PBMA in eight steps 
Source: Brambleby & Fordham, 2003, p. 4 
1. Choose a set of meaningful programmes. 
2. Identify current activity and expenditure 
in those programmes. 
3. Think of improvements. 
4. Weigh up incremental costs and 
incremental benefits and prioritize a list. 
5. Consult widely. 
6. Decide on changes. 
7. Effect the changes. 
8. Evaluate progress. 
4.3.4 Programme budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA) 
A third tool that can be used in priority setting while responding to objectives related to both 
efficiency and equity is the programme budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA), which has 
been used internationally in health contexts since early 1990s. It consists in an eight steps process 
(see box 1) that helps decision-makers to maximize the 
impact of health care resources on the health needs of 
a local population. The programme budgeting part of 
this framework consists in an appraisal of the past 
resource allocations in specified programmes. It may 
be client-group-base (e.g. the elderly, people with 
mental health problems, etc) or disease-group-based 
(e.g. cancer, cardiovascular disease, etc.). The marginal 
analysis part is an appraisal of incremental costs and 
benefits of a proposed investment, especially from 
shifting resources from one area to another. As 
Robinson states, "an essential feature of the approach 
is the focus on expenditures at the margin (i.e. 
marginal met need and marginal unmet need), with a view to determining priorities for increased 
and reduced expenditure." (p. 18) Consequently, it is still – such as economic evaluations of health 
interventions – based on underlying economic principles, but in addition to this, its practical 
application leads to a more pragmatic approach.  
Here are some advantages of this PBMA process: 
• It can inform decisions in a timely manner (Mitton & Donaldson, 2003). Generalized cost-
effectiveness analysis is often a long process that delays the availability of results.  
• Instead of seeing investment on the level of a hospital or drug budget, the focus is on 
specific health objectives, such as improving indicators of child health, etc. (Brambleby & 
Fordham, 2003). We can safely deduct that it can be used to fulfil equity objectives. 
• The emphasis is placed upon locally defined measures of expected health gains when 
determining priorities, rather than upon data extracted from cost per QALY league tables 
generated elsewhere (Robinson, 1999:18). 
• As per Mitton & Donalson (2004), PBMA provides an explicit mechanism for operalizing the 
economic principles of opportunity cost and the margin,  
• it helps to ensure a transparent priority setting process, 
• it allows for stakeholder consultation and public input17.  
Nevertheless, Robinson (1999:19) notes three possible weaknesses in the PBMA: 
• First, there can be some problem of information overload facing decision-makers. Even with the 
organizing framework offered by the PBMA, it is difficult to absorb and process the wide 
range of information associated with a large and diverse set of options. 
• Second, data on costs and effectiveness might not always be available. Important additional 
work may be needed. 
• Third, decision-makers in the public sector need to balance multiple objectives. Political 
considerations, managerial objectives, professional interests and public opinion all play an 
important part in the final outcomes. 
                                                          
17  Note that there is some divergence of opinion among authors regarding the consequences of public 
involvement in setting priorities. Robinson (1999:22) reports that as per some literature the public 
participation would be inherently inegalitarian. However, from other studies, the public appears to rank other 
criteria – such as equity – above that of allocative efficiency, and favours the "rule of rescue" and equality of 
lifetime opportunity for health ("fair innings") when making decisions regarding priorities, as we already saw 
from Nord (1999) and Williams (1997) respectively. 
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4.3.5 The Health-Sector-Wide Disease-Based Model 
This model was developed in 1993 and has many similarities with the PBMA technique, particularly 
in the fact that the research question is structured by health problem rather than health delivery 
setting and that a marginal perspective is adopted. It defers from PBMA in the sense that it can also 
be used at national level (rather than just locally) and that it ensures a focus on resource allocation 
between disease stages. 
All interventions and its related cost-effectiveness ratios are grouped by stage of disease and 
population target, accordingly: 
4. Primary prevention: population at risk 
5. Early identification: persons with undiagnosed disease 
6. Disease management/ prevention of complications: persons with established disease 
7. Treatment of end stage disease, palliative care: persons with advanced disease 
The advantage is that marginal costs and marginal benefits can be compared between 
interventions within and across different stages.  
Segal & Chen (2001) state that the model provides a mechanism to incorporate equity and 
societal objectives into the priority setting process. This occurs first in the description of benefit, 
which has to incorporate equity and access to the subgroups (p. 20). Second, the process for 
developing recommendations for resource shifts is designed to ensure the explicit consideration of 
equity/distributional effects of the ‘efficient solution’ on population subgroups. "Where there is no 
agreed understanding of the communities objectives in relation to health, exploration of these 
matters is desirable, possibly as a separate but complementary research program" (p. 22).  
 
4.3.6 Other tools 
During the fourth Forum of National Ethics Councils in 2004, Van der Wilt (2005:27-8) shared his 
experience about a procedure called participatory planning. It consists in involving the public and 
trying, through focus groups, to assess the value of certain novel programs. "It is meant to be used 
in situations of conflicting uses, scarce resources, and conflicting interests of parties with their own 
ideas of how best to use those limited resources. And, what is crucial, it is aimed at discovering 
what is really wanted, creating new preferences that better reflect needs and values, and developing 
new values."  
This method was for example used by his team in assessing cochlear implants for congenitally 
deaf children. It revealed that an important concern from parents was whether sign-language and 
oral communication actually compete or whether they reinforce each other. At that time, cochlear 
implants were evaluated by assessing to what extent children were using sign-language to a lesser 
extent. Whereas many parents of children who got an implant could tell you that upon having this 
implant, children would start signing more. This could be explained from experience with 
bilingualism, as learning one language may reinforce or facilitate learning another language. So the 
participatory planning showed important values that had not yet been assessed.  
Another tool, presented in 2003 by Coyle, Buxton & O'Brien is the "net benefit framework". 
This is a more theoretical method that permits consideration – among other things – of net benefit 
loss associated with incorporation of equity concerns. It is based on the fact that health care players 
often limit the reimbursement of therapies to a restrictive sub-group of patients on the basis of 
mere cost-effectiveness. This net benefit framework allows decision makers to focus on a more 
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explicit value judgment, i.e. whether the opportunity cost of equitable access is justified18. 
Finally, Schneider (2001) estimates that, even though the DALY methodology has been widely 
criticized, national Burden of Disease studies could be used to estimate the burden experienced 
by the poor by stratifying data.  
 
4.3.7 Selected experiences 
Examining some international experiences in priority setting of health services can be sometime 
illuminating. It particularly shows us how much this process can sometimes be a learning exercise in 
which policy-makers tried out a range of methods and approaches, adjusting course several times in 
the process (Ham, 1997:63). Three interesting regional or national experiences are reported below, 
by decreasing order of emphasis on equity concerns. 
The Parliamentary Priorities Commission of Sweden has set out in 1995 an explicit ethical 
platform to inform priority setting. Three principles were identified and ranked in descending order 
of importance, as such (ibid.:59): 
• The principle of human dignity: all people are equal in dignity, regardless of personal 
characteristics and functions in society. 
• The principle of need and solidarity: resources should be committed to the person or activity 
most in need of them. 
• The principle of cost-efficiency: when choosing between different fields of activity or 
measures, a reasonable relation between cost and effect, measured in improved health and 
improved quality of life, should be aimed for. 
We can remark that the second point is explicitly dealing with vertical equity. In addition, the 
Commission rejected a principle of allocating resources where the greatest health benefit could be 
secured. As the ethical theory suggests that society gives equal priority to groups with different 
capacity to benefit, we can safely say that this goes along with equity criteria. Ham (1997:159) 
reports that this approach would normally not allow discrimination on age, birth weight, lifestyle or 
whether illnesses were self-inflicted. Only if the third (efficiency) principle was to be applied, patient 
characteristics could be used to determine priorities for treatment. 
The state of Oregon developed a unique approach to determining the list of interventions 
available for Medicaid eligible. It first set a list of priorities using a league table of interventions but 
this had to be abandoned because of criticisms due mainly to inaccuracies and methodological 
problems. A new list was created, based on a more subjective approach including: 
• Public consultation: 47 community meetings were organized by the Health Services 
Commission of Oregon to determine the values that are considered to be important in 
priority setting, such as "prevention", "equity", effectiveness of treatment", "benefits many", 
"personal responsibility", "community compassion", etc. 
• The Commission's own judgement: the commission created 17 major categories of services 
and ranked these categories according to the values prioritized through public consultation. 
• Research evidence: the 17 categories were ranked by their cost-effectiveness ratios. In a final 
step, the commission rearranged the ranking of the 17 categories according to their own 
values.  
The top 9 categories were identified as essential services. They consist in the services that 
preserve life (treatment for fatal conditions), maternity care, preventive care for children and adults, 
                                                          
18   For more information, see Coyle, Buxton & O'Brien (2003), where this framework is entirely described. 
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reproductive services, and comfort care for the terminally ill. 19 
Note that this prioritization respects equity principles which are; allocation according to need; 
maximin; and rule of rescue. Preventive care can be associated with equity principles as well, in the 
sense that the major risk factors to health occur more commonly in the poor, who typically have 
less autonomy and fewer resources to reduce risks. Indeed, the World Health Report 2002 
(WHO:165) states that reducing major risks has the potential to substantially reduce inequalities 
worldwide, as changes are likely to be greatest in the poor20. 
New Zealand conducted a priority-setting exercise with the aim to reducing their problem of 
long waiting lists for elective surgery and to making the priority-process more transparent and 
consistent across hospitals. Priority for surgery was generally be given to the patients who were 
most likely to benefit, thus following efficiency consideration.  Following the exercise, several social 
and equity factors were incorporated in the priority criteria. The most important were the patient's 
age, work status, family responsibility, threat of the loss of their own independence, and time 
already spent on the waiting list (Hauck, Smith & Goddard, 2003:19). 
Low- and middle-income countries are experiencing different patterns in setting priority 
criteria. James et al. (2004:15) point out that country specific basic or essential packages have been 
specified in some of those countries, but not all of them have in practice implemented such 
packages. 
Two major institutions have come with recommendations for a basic or essential package of 
services. The first one is the World Bank in its World Development Report 1993, who valued basic 
packages for low-income countries at 26 International Dollars (I$) and for middle-income countries 
at 40 I$. Recommendation was given that health services with low cost-effectiveness should be 
excluded from this package in low-income countries. Such services include heart surgery; treatment 
– other than pain relief – of highly fatal cancers; intensive care for severely premature babies, 
expensive HIV drug therapy, etc.  
The second one comes from the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (2001), 
with a package of about USD 34 per person per year. Each country would need to define an overall 
programme of 'essential interventions' to be guaranteed through universal coverage. The criteria 
suggested in choosing these essential interventions were (p. 10) :  
(1) they should be technically efficacious and can be delivered successfully;  
(2) the targeted diseases should impose a heavy burden on society, taking into account individual 
illness as well as social spillovers (such as epidemics and adverse economic effects);  
(3) social benefits should exceed costs of the interventions (with benefits including life-years saved 
and spillovers such as fewer orphans or faster economic growth); and  
(4) the needs of the poor should be stressed. 
These criteria are mainly efficacy, efficiency and equity based on economic status. Key interventions 
identified by Group 5 of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (2002) were skilled birth 
attendance and focused antenatal care; vaccination services; improved case management of 
childhood disease; as well as interventions focusing on malaria, tuberculosis, smoking, and 
HIV/AIDS. 
                                                          
19   For more information, Ham (1997) and Hauck, Smith & Goddard (2003:18) 
20  As per WHO (2002:xiii), "The ten leading risk factors globally are: underweight; unsafe sex; high blood pressure; 
tobacco consumption; alcohol consumption; unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene; iron deficiency; indoor smoke from solid fuels; 
high cholesterol and obesity. Together, these account for more than one-third of all deaths worldwide.  
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5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
Priorities for future research on the equity-efficiency trade-off for resource allocation in health 
should be set based on identification of the most important gaps in current knowledge. 
Recommendations emerging from the literature will be considered here, which leads us to 
recommend an agenda for research in the following areas: who should establish priority values; how 
should research be conducted (methodological concerns); the need of empirical research to define 
the equity criteria and equity weights to be taken into consideration; what set of tools would be the 
most practical for the appropriate use by policy-makers; and – last but not least – who should 
conduct the research recommended. 
 
5.1 AGREE ON STAKEHOLDERS TO ESTABLISH PRIORITY VALUES 
Robinson (1999:20) notes that district health authorities are faced with numerous constituencies 
when setting health priorities: public opinion can be seen as a "bottom-up consultation", experts 
and specialists are providing "professional opinions", researchers establish "research-based 
evidence" and central and regional governments set "top-down priorities". In the same way, when 
analysts try to establish weights to be assigned to each criterion, the choice of respondents 
(politicians, ordinary citizens, professionals) would influence the results of empirical studies 
(Lindholm et al., 1996: 214). Ham (1997:64) states that both public and experts need to be involved 
for priority-setting to have legitimacy. 
When valuing health gains from an intervention (in QALYs or other health outcome indicators), 
as well as for the valuation of the severity of health conditions – as an equity principle, results 
would depend on whether the condition has already been experienced or is only feared. As seen 
earlier in chapter 2.2.1, this is due to the fact that those who never experienced the condition at 
stake (e.g. paraplegia) only focus on the transitional losses and the fear associated with the change of 
health, ignoring the adaptation process. Consequently, health economic valuation techniques usually 
used (EuroQol 5D, for example) give priority to states that people fear most. Dolan (2005:13-19) 
moves towards the position that we should rather give greater priority to health states that people 
experience (in opposition to fear) as being worse, by having patients valuing health states. At the same 
time, he advises to collect more data on how the general public value a wide range of efficiency and 
equity trade-offs.  
Still, there is some divergence of opinion among authors regarding the consequences of public 
involvement in setting priorities. Robinson (1999:22) reports that – as per some literature – the 
public participation would be inherently inegalitarian. However, from other studies (Nord, 1999; 
Williams, 1997), the public ranks some equity criteria above allocative efficiency, favouring among 
others the "rule of rescue" and equality of lifetime opportunity for health ("fair innings"). For the 
WHO Task Force on Health System Research Priorities for Equity in Health, the degree to which 
non-elite groups can influence political decision-making over the allocation of resources for health 
will impact on the possibility for equity values to be realized (WHO, 2004:8-10). In any case, more 
research is needed on the consequences of public involvement in priority-setting. 
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5.2 IMPROVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES 
Different gaps in research methodologies have been stressed. The first ones concern issues arising 
when trying to define societal values:  
• Research into the objectives of the health sector as defined by the community is required 
(Segal & Chen, 2001:17), as well as a consensus on the definition of health care need. As seen 
in chapter 3.3 on Measures of inequities, the fact that there has been little analysis of vertical 
equity in use of health care can be explained by the fact that we would need to use need 
variables, requiring value judgments. However, such studies are needed, as they would help 
policy-makers to formulate policies allowing for vertical equity. In the same way, differences 
in the use of health care have to be addressed only on the basis of unacceptable reasons, such 
as difference in income or information. A consensus is required in defining the reasons for 
acceptable variations in the use of health care (Oliver & Mossialos, 2004:657-8). 
• Dolan et al. (2005:205) report that there seems to be a diminishing marginal social value 
associated with changes in quality of life and length of life. However, this needs to be 
controlled for the possibility that people's preference may have been contaminated by the 
belief that there is a decreasing marginal value to incremental health benefits, as well as a 
diminishing marginal utility of life years (and possibly even by positive time preference). 
• In order to obtain unbiased measures of societal values with regard to equity, it is important 
to overcome the difficulties encountered in questionnaires and due to the limited capabilities 
of respondents to think about equity and efficiency in a tightly defined manner. Williams & 
Cookson (2000:1905) mention the need for more sophisticated methods for eliciting 
preferences by combining questionnaires with in-depth group discussions. This has the 
advantages of allowing respondents to have more time to digest and to reflect upon the 
questions. In addition, researchers would be able to gather qualitative evidence about how 
respondents have interpreted the questions. It is important to note that in developing 
countries, focus group discussion alone is often the most efficient method for eliciting 
preferences21. 
Central to research is the need to consider the characteristics of specific subgroups in order to 
assess the distributional impact of health interventions. This is rather a 'positive' approach, as 
opposed to a 'normative' one, i.e. one in which the analyst does not introduce his/her own norms in 
the analysis. Many authors state that researchers who undertake economic evaluations should 
systematically collect and report information on the characteristics of the populations benefiting 
from the health interventions appraised. This would allow them – when analysing the results – to 
disaggregate the information on the effects and the cost-effectiveness of the interventions into 
different subgroups (Sassi, Archard & Le Grand, 2001:70; Williams & Cookson, 2000:1907). This 
has also been referred to by Bobadilla (1998:44), who stresses the need for marginal cost-
effectiveness of interventions provided at different scales and intended for delivery in different 
settings, such as rural communities. Culyer (2001:282) goes further, stating that research into the 
actual distributions of health should be performed in advance of policy initiatives and routinely 
performed for key groups, in order to monitor distributional changes over time and their likely 
determinants. However, measuring effectiveness for the same intervention in different settings is 
expensive and involves complex research designs, which would explain the lack of information on 
marginal cost-effectiveness. 
 
 
                                                          
21  Considerations based on personal discussions with Dr Guy Carrin during the defence of this thesis. 
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5.3 ESTABLISH A SET OF VALUES THROUGH EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Many authors conclude their work by recommending that empirical investigations should be done 
that would help establishing an explicit set of values to be used in priority-setting. This set of values 
would include the type of equity criteria to be taken into consideration, as well as the weights to be 
assigned to efficiency and equity criteria (Ham, 1997:64; James et al., 2004: 17). For example, Nord 
et al. (1999:36-7) focused their cost-value analysis on two particular aspects of equity in addition to 
the efficiency criterion: the concern for severity and the concern for realization of potential. 
However, they noticed an aversion to inequality in health outcomes, which is one of the equity 
concept described above (see 3.2.4. on Egalitarism) and recommend that further research be done 
on the strength of aversion to inequalities in end states, in order to potentially address this factor in 
their modeling.  
A set of value among non-health factors is also needed. We saw that age and (dis)ability are 
often the only factors which are receiving attention in the literature on equity weighting. Even in 
non-biomedical health research in general, the current focus is on individual risk factors, without 
much consideration of the social context that impact on risk factors. Whether social exclusion 
occurring from other factors such as gender, ethnicity/racial, social class, religion or geographical 
location (urban/rural) should be weighted still needs to be considered. In a certain way, these 
factors may already be taken into consideration in the severity factor, as socially excluded 
individuals tend to experience higher severity health status and would thus be compensated through 
the severity-weighting process. However, this concern deserves further research. 
In addition, the fact that both age and fair innings (incorporating concerns for past suffering) 
have been taken into consideration in the literature on equity weighting does not mean that there is 
ethical theory or enough empirical evidence to suggest the strengths of such concerns. In fact, 
different studies (Johri et al., 2004; Nord, 2005; Richardson, 1999) conclude by stating that the 
application of age weights to utility measures such as QALY is premature and that ethical and 
empirical enquiry be conducted in order to determine weights that are constructed from the 
responses of people who have been encouraged to deliberate upon the issues and their implications. 
This would involve performing some public surveys that would examine the shape of an age 
weighting function and this for a wide variety of interventions types. 
Finally, establishing criteria for inclusion in equity concerns and weights to be assigned to each 
criteria would request to differentiate among attitudes between countries due to variations in 
political and cultural traditions. Consequently, extrapolation of results to other settings would be 
probably questionable (Lindholm et al., 1996:214), requesting differentiated empirical studies. 
 
5.4 MAKE PRACTICAL TOOLS AVAILABLE FOR POLICY-MAKERS 
We have seen that the three main trends arising in the health economic literature and concerning 
the necessity to incorporate equity concerns in the priority setting process are: equity weighted 
utility gains; cost-value analysis; and different frameworks allowing the use of clearly specified 
criteria. 
As Murray and Lopez (2000:79) state, an important area that will require further reflection and 
discourse is whether distributional/equity values should be directly incorporated into the estimation 
of the benefits of health interventions or be kept as a separate component of the evaluation of 
health interventions. Schneider (2001) recommends that DALYs should be valued higher when 
gained by disadvantaged groups, which would encourage measures to improve equity. Nord et al. 
(1999:37) notes that health state values with strong
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analysis model – is easier to use when calculating equity weighted QALYs. 
However, modelling society's valuation in numerical terms - such as equity weighted utility gains 
or cost-value analysis – may not be felt as really helpful in practice by analysts, health planners and 
policy-makers, as these tools are much less explicit with respect to the efficiency-equity trade-off. 
Such numerical approaches are "inherently reductionist" and "linguistically alienating to people", 
especially those who do not like numbers (Nord, 1999c:6).  Empirical research should examine 
which tool(s) would be more attractive to potential users. 
 
5.5 MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH IS NEEDED TO SUPPORT A 
MULTISECTORAL POLICY APPROACH 
The prioritized research agenda described above includes both theoretical and empirical work. It 
should be an interdisciplinary task where economists would get to grips with both philosophical 
concepts and social categorizations (Wiliams, 1997:128). Many constituencies should be involved in 
such research programmes: policy and statistical branches of government, researchers, health care 
providers, health care users, carers and the public at large (Culyer, 2001:282). 
The practical "real-world" constraints – such as majority rule voting, lobbying, donor 
constraints, bureaucratic issues, etc. – which policy-makers are forced to face when trying to 
implement equity and efficiency trade-offs in allocation policies remain a major issue and deserve 
more scrutiny. Such an agenda cannot be fulfilled without multidisciplinary alliances. Robinson 
(1999:23-4) notes that some economists may complain that devoting greater attention to the real-
world context in which priority setting decisions actually take place is not their area of expertise, but 
rather belong to political science and related disciplines. The author stresses that in any case health 
economics - outside the USA - is already a sub-discipline that has been closely involved with 
medical researchers and psychologists. Research on priority-setting in health would simply mean a 
different set of multi-disciplinary alliances, including a more general focus on the incentives and 
constraints governing the use of economic data. Williams & Cookson (2000:1907) add that health 
economists should use methods from psychology, sociology and philosophy in order to derive 
context-specific equity weights that could then be applied by policy analysts to efficiency data. 
Health economist may in the future succeed where others have failed in measuring equity-efficiency 
trade-offs. Therefore, not only should all partners be involved from the outset in the priority-setting 
process, but the economists' analysis should also be sought and taken into account. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
This literature review has shown the decisive need of further research in order to determine a set of 
tools that would prove to be the most practical for an appropriate use by policy-makers, allowing 
policy actors to design more group-specific measures without losing too much efficiency. Not only 
would this promote both equity and efficiency in the allocation of scarce resources for health, but it 
would force policy-makers to define and use explicit criteria and objectives for priority-setting. 
Practicality of tools is thus one of the main conditions in order for research to impact on both 
policy and practice.  
This work has reviewed methods and tools taking both equity and efficiency into consideration 
in the priority-setting process and reached the conclusion that more theoretical and, above all, 
empirical research is needed. Recommendations for further research in the area include the need for 
an increase involvement of the general public and health care providers in establishing priority 
values, both in prioritizing among different equity criteria and in assigning equity weights. In order 
to do so, researchers need to take into consideration some important methodological issues. These 
include, among others, more sophisticated methods for eliciting societal values and preferences, and 
the necessity to reach a consensus on the definition of health care need.  
Note that among the tools and selected experiences reviewed, a major equity concern appeared 
to be the inclusion of interventions that benefit the poor. This is easily understandable, as the poor 
still suffer a large reducible burden, with the poor suffering more from communicable diseases and 
from premature mortality. As the poor also suffer from many health problems which do not have 
cost-effective solutions and as there is now strong evidence that the major determinant of health in 
poor countries is indeed poverty, policies aimed at benefiting the poor are a priority.  
Therefore, further important recommendations on methodological issues are based on the need 
for subgroups to beneficiate from special consideration in research. This would enable assessing the 
distributional impact of health interventions. Furthermore, differentiated empirical studies are 
required to account for local circumstances and constraints – including political and cultural 
demands – that impact on priority-setting. 
Nevertheless, another area of research that is of paramount importance is a thorough analysis of 
practical "real-world" constraints – such as majority rule voting, lobbying, donor constraints, 
bureaucratic issues, etc. – that policy-makers are facing when trying to implement equity and 
efficiency trade-offs. Such issues were not included within the objectives of this paper, but remain a 
key concern for allowing practical tools to be used by decision-makers. 
Such findings challenge the traditional view of economists and highlight the need for multi- and 
cross-disciplinary alliances in research. Overall, this paper provides both researchers and policy 
actors with a wide and challenging research agenda for equity and efficiency in priority-setting.  
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